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1 Introduction
When a …rm engages in R&D for the production technology, it generally encoun-
ters two distinct forms of uncertainty. First, there is technological uncertainty
in the sense that the relationship between the rate of R&D investments and
innovations is probabilistic. This can be restated by saying that the knowhow
leading to innovations takes ’time to build’in an unpredictable way. Second,
there is economic uncertainty in the sense that both the product market de-
mand and the investment rate required to maintain a given intensity of R&D
(the cost of R&D) ‡uctuate unpredictably over time. Possible sources for the
latter ‡uctuation are, for example, uncertainty in exogenous R&D input markets
and unpredictable changes in government regulations.
A general notion of the extant innovation literature is that the attractiveness
of R&D investments depends on the incremental product market pro…ts accrued
to a successful innovator relative to an unsuccessful one, not on the absolute
pro…t levels per se (eg. Aghion et al., 2001). Consequently, intensifying product
market competition generally renders R&D investments more attractive though
it is possible that the total industry pro…ts decline. The mechanics behind this is
known as the selection e¤ect of competition, originating with Vickers (1995): as
in a more competitive industry the pro…ts earned by the technological leader are
larger relative to the competitors, intensifying competition creates incentives for
R&D by increasing the incremental pro…ts. Assuming the polar case of perfect
competition leads to the Schumpeterian model of innovation (Schumpeterian
branch of the endogenous growth theory) in that the market is occupied by one
insider …rm at a time, with the market outsiders earning zero pro…ts. Acting
as an incumbent monopolist, the insider …rm has lower incentives for R&D
than a market outsider striving to capture the incumbency. Particularly, under
relatively mild conditions, the Arrow replacement e¤ect takes over, meaning that
in equilibrium the insider will choose not to perform R&D and an innovating
outsider always becomes the new monopolist (eg. Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
The objective of this paper is to extend the theoretical boundaries of the
innovation literature by studying the optimal management of R&D investments
in a genuinely dynamic industry where the two forms of uncertainty coexist to-
gether with operational ‡exibility to adjust the rate of investments in response
to the resolution of economic uncertainty. The context is a continuous time
industry organised as a duopoly with respect to both production and R&D.
The duopoly …rms compete with homogenous products and engage in R&D
with the aim of gaining competitive advantage in the product market through
productivity-enhancing innovations. Intermediate competition intensities be-
tween perfect competition and pure Cournot competition is allowed for by the
conjectural variations approach, as a simpler alternative to the popular product
di¤erentiation approach. Technological progress is characterised by a ’quality
ladder’dynamics where, in contrast to the step-by-step dynamics (eg. Harris
and Vickers, 1987), the technological laggard does not have to catch up with
the leader at the cutting edge before racing for the technological leadership in
the future. In other words, upon innovating the laggard leapfrogs the leader
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by advancing directly to the new cutting edge. Depending on the intensity of
competition, leapfrogging may be of the strong type in that the product market
is characterised by a persistent monopoly in the fashion of the Schumpeterian
model, or of the weak type in that both …rms are earning pro…ts (Encaoua and
Ulph, 2004). Along the lines of Aghion et al. (1997), it is assumed that the
technological gap between the duopoly …rms cannot exceed one innovation. The
implied absence of the ’escape competition’motive rules out the incentives of
the leader to perform R&D (see eg. Mookherjee and Ray, 1991, for discussion
on the motive),
Arguably, industries most susceptible to the leapfrogging dynamics (and to
the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction, see eg. Diamond, 2006) are
those characterised by rapid technological progress and vigorous competition
over the leadership. Recent examples include the leapfrogging of Dell’s direct
retailing model over the previously dominant PC retailers (IBM, HP and Com-
paq), the leapfrogging of Walmart over the other US retailers in the use of
information technology to manage the supply chain logistics, the leapfrogging
of Nokia’s mobile phone technology and design over Motorola in the late eighties
and early nineties, the leapfrogging of Apple’s IPod over the previous genera-
tion of mobile music devices, the leapfrogging of online security brokers over
the traditional brokers, and the leapfrogging of online travel agencies (Expidia,
Travelocity, Orbitz etc.) over the bricks-and-mortar agencies. As for ongoing
competition of the weak leapfrogging type, where one …rm takes the lead in one
generation and the competitor in the next, illustrative examples are the race
between the graphics card manufacturers ATI and NVIDIA for superior graph-
ics processing unit (GPU) technology and the race between Intel and AMD for
central processing unit (CPU) performance.
Besides the papers mentioned above, our paper is related to a wide range
of other papers revolving around R&D. For example, Lee and Wilde (1980)
study strategic R&D investments, focusing on the relationship between R&D
and market structure. Reinganum (1982) studies strategic R&D, focusing on
patent protection and imitation. Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Grossman and
Shapiro (1987) study strategic R&D in multistage patent races with the em-
phasis on …nding the conditions under which a race is characterised by vigorous
competition and when it degenerates to a monopoly. Dixit (1988) provides
a general framework for studying R&D races when the competing …rms are
heterogeneous in the e¢ciency of R&D. Pennings and Lint (1997) construct a
jump-di¤usion model to allow for the possibility that the arrival of strategic
information (on new standards, for example) may have a drastic impact on the
projected cash ‡ow generated by a new product. Childs and Triantis (1999)
study R&D investments when there is operational ‡exibility to alter between
multiple R&D projects. Schwartz (2003) and Schwartz and Moon (2001) study
R&D investments when there is an exogenous probability of what is called a
catastrophic event, such as losing a patent race. Weeds (2002) considers both
cooperation and non-cooperation in an R&D race that is subject to a winner-
takes-all patent system. Huisman and Kort (2003) consider optimal adoption of
new technology in a symmetric duopoly when a …rm has operational ‡exibility
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to decide both when to adopt and what technology to adopt.
Summing up, the questions of the analysis are:
1. Given the leapfrogging dynamics, what is the programme for the optimal
management of R&D investments?
2. How does product market uncertainty a¤ect the optimal management?
3. How does R&D cost uncertainty a¤ect the optimal management?
4. How does technological uncertainty a¤ect the optimal management?
5. How does the intensity of product market competition a¤ect the optimal
management?
The main …ndings are as follows. To begin with, the analysis is constructed
in such a way (by use of suitable linearity assumptions) that the applicable sto-
chastic control problems become optimal switching problems, as opposed to a
continuous control problems. Particularly, as the leader has no incentives for
R&D, it su¢ces to …nd the rule that determines whether or not it is optimal for
the existing follower to perform R&D. We show that in the absence of hysteresis
this rule derives from a unique switching trigger. In the one dimensional case
where R&D cost uncertainty is excluded, the trigger is de…ned for a stochastic
demand shock. In the two dimensional case, on the other hand, the trigger is de-
…ned for the ratio between the shock and the ‡ow R&D cost, due to a particular
linear homogeneity property. The comparative statics of the two triggers reveals
a number of important properties. First, we reproduce the selection e¤ect by
showing that the triggers are inversely related to the intensity of product market
competition. Second, we establish a U-shaped investment-uncertainty relation-
ship by showing that the triggers …rst decrease and then increase as product
market uncertainty (in the mean preserving sense) gets higher. Moreover, R&D
cost uncertainty has the same e¤ect. Making use of real options concepts, we
derive the economic intuition from an interaction between an option value for
delaying and an opportunity cost of delaying. The e¤ect of technological uncer-
tainty manifests itself through the (expected) lag between engaging into R&D
and leapfrogging. We show that the triggers increase monotonously in the lag.
In other words, higher ’time to build’renders R&D investments less attractive,
a result by no means obvious a priori.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up the duopoly by intro-
ducing the product market and the leapfrogging dynamics. Section 3 devises
the stochastic control problems and solves for the optimal switching trigger in
both the one dimensional case and in the two dimensional case. Section 4 carries
out the comparative statics. Section 5 …nally concludes and proposes a number
directions towards which the analysis can be extended.
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2 Basic setup
We consider an industry organised as a duopoly with respect to both production
and R&D. Time is continuous and the planning horizon in…nite. The duopoly
…rms are risk neutral and output homogeneous products with constant unit
cost technologies. The …rms utilise R&D as a means for gaining competitive
advantage in the product market: by enhancing cost e¢ciency, an innovation
enables a …rm to expand its market share.
Product market. The inverse demand function in the product market is of the
unit elastic form
?? =
??
?? + ?^?
? (1)
where (??? ?^?) is the pair of outputs at time ? and ?? is a systematic shock driven
by a geometric Brownian motion
??? = ?????+ ??????? ?0 = ?? (2)
where ??? is the increment of a standard Brownian motion, ? is a drift coe¢cient
? and is a di¤usion coe¢cient measuring the degree of product market volatility.
Under risk neutrality it must be that ? = ? ¡ ? where ? is the riskfree rate of
return and ? ¸ 0 is the equilibrium rate of return shortfall. It is also standard
to show (eg. Øksendal 2003, p. 62) that
?? = ????+??? ?
where the adjusted drift ? = ?¡ ?22 . We assume
? ? ?max =
p
2?
to make ? ? 0. This assures that the shock will reach any …nite value above ? in
…nite time almost surely. For brevity, notation A? is adopted for the di¤erential
operator associated with the shock:
A? = 1
2
?2?2
?2
??2
+ ??
?
??
?
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The intensity of product market competition is measured by a conjectural vari-
ation parameter ? 2 [0? 1]. The idea is that when choosing ? so as to maximise
pro…ts, a …rm conjectures that the competitor reacts according to
??^
??
= ¡?? (3)
A larger ? represents more intense competition with pure Cournot competition
and pure Bertrand competition obtaining in the polar cases. For further dis-
cussion, we refer to Varian (1992, pp. 302-303). In the innovation literature, a
popular alternative to conjectural variation is to assume product di¤erentiation
by way of specifying a CES utility function for the representative consumer (eg.
Aghion et al., 1997, and Aghion et al., 2001). In that setup ? would enter as
the elasticity of substitution between the products.
Equilibrium pro…ts. Due to unit elastic demand an equiproportional change in
the unit costs leaves the equilibrium pro…ts unchanged since only the relative
cost matters. Formally, let ? denote the unit cost of the more e¢cient …rm
relative to the less e¢cient …rm. The total ‡ow pro…ts in equilibrium are then
given by
§(?? ?) =
8<:
(1+?2)(1+?2)¡4??
(1¡?)(1+?)2 ? 0 · ?? · 1
1 ¡ ?? 1 ? ?? · 1? ?
(4)
The allocation of the less cost e¢cient …rm is
? (?? ?) =
8<:
1
(1¡?)(1+?)2 (?¡ ?)
2 ? 0 · ?? · 1
0? 1 ? ?? · 1?
(5)
while the allocation of the more cost e¢cient …rm is
§(?? ?) ¡ ? (?? ?) =
8<:
1
(1¡?)(1+?)2 (1 ¡ ??)
2 ? 0 · ?? · 1
1 ¡ ?? 1 ? ?? · 1? ?
(6)
For 1 ? ?? · 1? competition is su¢ciently intense for the more cost e¢cient …rm
to monopolise the product market.
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R&D environment. The …rms are identical in terms of R&D. The ‡ow cost func-
tion associated with R&D is a linear function of the instantaneous R&D input
? as ?? ? 0 where ? ? 0. We assume ? can be changed with no adjustment costs
and, without loss of generality, restrict ? 2 [0? 1]. As in Aghion et al. (1997),
the technological gap between the …rms cannot exceed one innovation. This
assumption can be rationalised on two grounds. First, it may be prohibitively
costly in terms of R&D e¤ort to extend the gap beyond one innovation. Second,
the technologies lagging the cutting edge may have zero patent protection due to
the reluctance of the cutting edge …rm to pay a renewal fee for the protection of
an outdated technology. The expiration of patents then occurs in tandem with
innovations. Particularly, when an innovation advances a …rm to the cutting
edge, the lapse of protection on its outdated technology makes it possible for
the competitor to imitate or copy. The patent protection on the cutting edge
technology, on the other hand, is perfect so there are no technological spillovers
between the …rms.
The …rms are subject to technological uncertainty which means that the
relationship between R&D inputs and innovations is probabilistic. Speci…cally,
we assume there exists a Poisson innovation process allowing improvements in
cost e¢ciency such that when a …rm innovates its unit cost is scaled down to
the fraction ? ? 1 of the current level. The hazard rate (mean arrival rate) of
innovations is a linear function of the R&D input as ?? where ? ? 0 measures
the e¢ciency of R&D. The memoryless property of Poisson processes rules out
cumulative e¤ects and spillovers from past R&D.
Furthermore, the …rms are subject to a leapfrogging dynamics which means
that the technological follower can gain competitive advantage by directly adopt-
ing technology more cost e¢cient than the cutting edge. In other words, the
product market never has neck-and-neck competition since the follower does
not have to catch up with the leader before racing for technological dominance.
This in contrast to the step-by-step dynamics which requires that the follower
draw level with the leader …rst (see eg. Aghion et al., 2001, and Hoernig, 2003).
Particularly, since the technological gap in the duopoly is a …xed at one in-
novation, there is only one competitive state in the product market, with the
identities of the leader and the follower changing whenever leapfrogging takes
place. Along the lines of Encaoua and Ulph (2004), we rationalise leapfrogging
through the notion of successful R&D, by stating that the follower in the course
of undertaking R&D learns to master the cutting edge and so is in the position
to achieve the same technology as the leader would if it innovated, the new and
improved cutting edge.
The above implies that the duopoly has ? is …xed at the leader-follower
relative unit cost, given by ?. For 1 ? ?? · 1? the product market is characterised
by a persistent monopoly, with the identity of the monopolist changing upon
innovations. We then say that strong leapfrogging obtains. For 0 · ?? · 1 the
…rms coexist in the product market instead and we say that weak leapfrogging
obtains. Subtracting (5) from (6) with ? = ? yields the ‡ow pro…t spread
coe¢cient
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¢ = ¢(?? ?) =
(
(1 + ?)1¡?1+? ? 0 · ?? · 1
1 ¡ ?? 1 ? ?? · 1? ?
(7)
The fact that ¢ increases in ? under weak leapfrogging is an instance of the more
general Boone reallocation criterion (Boone, 2001) which states that intensifying
competition must reallocate pro…ts from ine¢cient to more e¢cient …rms. Due
to unit elastic demand ¢ is path independent of the innovation process.
3 Optimal R&D Management
In the section we …nd the optimal lifetime R&D management programmes for
the duopoly …rms. We start the analysis by formulating the lifetime pro…t max-
imisation problems (valuation problems) as stochastic control problems. Having
done that, we proceed to invoke standard techniques of stochastics and dynamic
programming in order to …nd the rules governing the optimal instantaneous
R&D inputs. Table 1 summarises the assumptions and their main implications
for the analysis. Since there are no cumulative e¤ects from past R&D and the
planning horizon is in…nite, the problems are time homogenous. The properties
of Itô di¤usions (eg. Øksendal 2003, pp. 115-116) moreover imply that the
problems are Markov. In other words, the optimal R&D rules are independent
of the evolution of calendar time and depend on the current shock value only.
Assumption Implication
Unit elastic demand ¢ path independent of the innovation process
Poisson innovation process No spillovers/cumulative e¤ects from past R&D
Leapfrogging dynamics No neck-and-neck product market competition
+ Technological gap at 1 Only 1 competitive state in the product market
Table 1: assumptions
We denote the instantaneous R&D inputs of the …rms by ?? and ?^?. Discard-
ing the terms of second order in ??, Table 2 displays the associated probabilities
for the four innovation scenarios over [?? ? + ??].
competitor (?^?)
…rm (??)
innovates fails to innovate
innovates 0 (II) ????? (IF)
fails to innovate ?^???? (FI) 1 ¡ (?? + ?^?)??? (FF)
Table 2: innovation scenarios over [?? ? + ??]
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3.1 Problem formulation
De…ne a relative unit cost process ?? to track the technological position of a …rm
relative to the competitor in the passage of time. The R&D environment implies
that ?? is driven by a Poisson jump process as follows. The process starts from
either the leader position ? or the follower position 1? and jumps to the reciprocal
value 1?? in the event that leapfrogging takes place over [?? ?+ ??]. In the event
that the duopoly …nishes the in…nitesimal period in the same con…guration it
started it, with the identities of the leader and the follower unchanged, the
process remains static. Now suppose the tracked …rm is in the leader position
at time ?. Since scenario (II) in Table 2 can be ruled out as an impossibility, the
possibility of the process remaining static is then accounted for by (IF) and (FF),
the total probability of which is 1¡ ?^????. With the complementary probability
?^???? associated with (FI), the process jumps upwards to 1?? . Symmetrically, in
the follower position the possibility of the process remaining static is accounted
for by (FI) and (FF), the total probability of which is 1¡?????. Combining the
two positions we have
??? =
( ¡?? + 1?? ? with probability ??(??)??
0? with probability 1 ¡ ??(??)??
(8)
where
??(?) =
(
???? ? = 1?
?^??? ? = ??
Let E??? denote the expectation operator associated with the probability law
of the shock when it starts at ? for ? = ? ¸ 0. Also de…ne a pro…t coe¢cient
process ?? = ??? that in the follower position takes on the value ?(?? ?) and
in the leader position the value §(?? ?) ¡ ?(?? ?), with § and ? de…ned as in
(4) and (5). By the Markov property of Itô di¤usions, the pro…t maximisation
problems of the …rms are then stated by the pair of optimal stochastic control
problems
? ¤(?? ?) = sup
??
E?
½
E???
Z 1
?
?¡??(????? ¡ ???)??
¾
? (9)
and
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?^ ¤(?? ?) = sup
?^?
E?
½
E???
Z 1
?
?¡??((§(?? ?) ¡ ???)?? ¡ ?^??)??
¾
? (10)
where E? denotes the expectation operator associated with the probability law
of ?? when ?? = ?. We suppress the technical rigor of the analysis by assum-
ing/guessing straight out there exist a unique pair of controls (?¤? ? ?^¤? ) attaining
the suprema. These controls represent the optimal R&D programmes over the
in…nite planning horizon. As optimal performance functions, ? ¤ and ?^ ¤ then
represent the …rm values. We also note that since (9) is implicitly conditioned
on ?^¤? and (10) is conditioned on ?¤? , the problem pair de…nes in general terms a
stochastic di¤erential game with (?¤? ? ?^¤? ) constituting a Markovian Nash equilib-
rium. Now, however, genuine strategic interaction in terms of R&D is ruled out
by construction: as investments into R&D do not have any potential to improve
the competitive position under the one innovation limit on the technological
gap, the leader will always opt out from R&D competition. Put di¤erently, the
leader has no incentives for R&D due to the absence of the ’escape competition’
motive. Recalling that the …rms are identical except for the unit cost, it is also
clear that ?¤? and ?^¤? display symmetry in the sense that ?^¤? equals ?¤? condi-
tional on the unit cost 1?? while ?
¤
? equals ?^¤? conditional on ??. Hence, when
leapfrogging takes place the …rm values are switched.
Below we reserve ? ¤ for the time ? = ? follower. Decomposing ? ¤ to the
instantaneous pro…ts and to the value of the future pro…ts with
?? = ????? ¡ ????
yields the Bellman equation
? ¤(?? ?) = sup
??
E?
(
E???
(Z ?+??
?
?¡??????+
Z 1
?+??
?¡??????
))
= sup
??
E?
½
?¡??(?(?? ?)?¡ ??)??+ E???
Z 1
?+??
?¡??????
¾
= sup
??
½
?¡??(?(?? ?)?¡ ??)?? + E?
½
E???
Z 1
?+??
?¡??????
¾¾
? (11)
The expectation in (11) necessitates distinguishing the scenarios where leapfrog-
ging has and has not taken place over [?? ? + ??]. Given that leapfrogging has
not taken place, an application of Itô’s lemma together with the di¤erential
operator
A??? = ??? + A??
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yields
sup
??
E?
½
E???
Z 1
?+??
?¡??????
¾
= ? ¤(?? ?) + E????? ¤(?? ?)
= ? ¤(?? ?) + (A???? ¤(?? ?))??? (12)
Given that leapfrogging has taken place, similarly
sup
??
E?
½
E???
Z 1
?+??
?¡??????
¾
= ?^ ¤(?? ?) + (A????^ ¤(?? ?))??? (13)
by the symmetry argument. Weighing (12) and (13) by the respective probabil-
ities and substituting the obtained expectation into (11), we …nd on discarding
the terms of order higher than ?? that the follower problem is stated by the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
sup
?
©A???? ¤(?? ?) + ?¡??(?(?? ?)?¡ ??) + ??¢¤(?? ?)ª = 0? (14)
where ¢¤ is the leader-follower value spread:
¢¤(?? ?) = ?^ ¤(?? ?) ¡ ?¤(?? ?)?
By formal analogy, the leader value satis…es the Bellman equation
A????^ ¤(?? ?) + ?¡??(§(?? ?) ¡ ?(?? ?))?¡ ?¤?¢¤(?? ?) = 0? (15)
with ?¤ attaining the supremum in (14). The fact that the functional inside the
supremum is a¢ne in ? implies that ?¤ is bang bang, constituting a solution to
an optimal switching problem (sequential stopping problem) with two operating
modes: the follower obtains the best performance by either undertaking R&D
with the maximal input or temporarily suspending R&D. In economic terms,
the dynamic decision between the operating modes is governed by an in…nite
sequence of switching options. Since the timing of exercise it totally free, these
options allow similar operational ‡exibility as American-style …nancial options
with in…nite expiration (see eg. Merton 1992, pp. 255-308, for the fundaments
on …nancial options). Moreover, since exercise activates the next option in the
sequence, or the option to make the converse switch, the options are compound
options in the sense of Geske (1979).
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Remark 1 The assumption of no adjustments costs translates to costless switch-
ing. By ruling out hysteresis, this enables us to …nd a closed form solution for
?¤. Speci…cally, since there is no range of inertia associated between switch-
ing out of the R&D mode and switching out of the suspension mode, ?¤ will
be de…ned in terms of a single condition representing indi¤erence between the
two operating modes. Switching costs would necessitate two distinct indi¤erence
conditions, one for each operating mode. For further discussion on hysteresis,
we refer to Dixit (1992), Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 213-244).
Since the planning horizon is in…nite, the discounting factor ?¡?? is the only
source of the ?-dependence in (14) and (15). Hence, it is natural to impose solu-
tions of the separated form ?¡??? ¤(?) and ?¡???^ ¤(?) (the method of separating
variables for PDEs). Then letting ¢¤(?) = ?^ ¤(?) ¡ ? ¤(?), we …nd that (14) is
equivalent to
sup
?
fA?? ¤(?) + ?(?? ?)?+ ?(?¢¤(?) ¡ ?)g = ?? ¤(?)? (16)
while (15) is equivalent to
A??^ ¤(?) + ?^(?? ?)?¡ ?¤?¢¤(?) = ??^ ¤(?)? (17)
where ?^(?? ?) = §(?? ?)¡?(?? ?). We restrict attention to the special case ? = 0
to simplify ? ¤ = ? ¤ and ?^ = ?^ ¤.
Solution conditions. The necessary and su¢cient solution conditions for optimal
switching problems are provided by Brekke and Øksendal (1993). Sometimes re-
ferred to as the impulse control veri…cation theorem, these conditions relate the
solution of an impulse control problem to solving a system of quasi-variational
inequalities for the optimal performance function which now is ? ¤, as charac-
terised by (16). In conjunction with solving for ? ¤ (and ?^ ¤), also ?¤ is found.
We note that the impulse controls pertaining to the follower problem are of the
double sequence form f(? ?); (??)g where the ? ? are shock adapted stopping times
with ? ? ¸ ? ?+1 (a.s.) and the ?? are control actions taking values from f0? 1g.
Assuming that the follower starts in the suspension mode at time ? = 0, all
odd controls equal unity while all even controls equal zero. Hence, the optimal
impulse control associated with ? ¤ is of the form f(?¤? ); (?¤? )g where the ?¤? are
optimal stopping times to be determined subject to (?¤? ) = (1? 0? ???? 1? 0? 1? ???).
For distinguishing between the operating modes, we below de…ne the partic-
ipating functions in (?? ?)-space. We also de…ne a switching operator M as
M?(?? ?) = ?(?? 1 ¡ ?)?
12
Suppressing the arguments, the quasi-variational system for ? ¤ = ? ¤(?? ?) may
then be written as
?? ¤ ¸ A?? ¤ + ??+ ?(?¢¤ ¡ ?) (18a)
? ¤ ¸ M? ¤ (18b)
(A?? ¤ ¡ ?? ¤ + ??+ ?(?¢¤ ¡ ?))(? ¤ ¡ M? ¤) = 0? (18c)
The complementary equation (18c) imposes necessary continuation and switch-
ing conditions as follows. When continuing in the current operating mode is
optimal (?¤ = ?¤(?) = ?), (18a) holds with equality, as a Bellman equation.
When switching out of the current operating mode is optimal (?¤ = 1 ¡ ?),
(18b) holds with equality instead. Then also
A?(M? ¤) ¡ ?M? ¤ + (1 ¡ ?)(?M¢¤ ¡ ?) = 0? (19)
The suspension region for the shock is de…ned as
C0 = f? ¸ 0 : ?¤(?) = 0g? (20)
and the R&D region by
C1 = f? ¸ 0 : ?¤(?) = 1g? (21)
Hence, the continuation region is de…ned in (?? ?)-space by
C = f(?? ?) : ? 2 C0 and ?¤(?) = 0 or ? 2 C1 and ?¤(?) = 1g?
The fact that outside C (18a) obtains concomitantly with ? ¤ = M? ¤ and (19)
implies
?(?M¢¤ ¡ ?) · (1 ¡ ?)(?M¢¤ ¡ ?)?
Hence,
(?? ?) = (?? 0) ?2 C ) ?M¢¤ ¸ ?? (22)
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and
(?? ?) = (?? 1) ?2 C ) ?M¢¤ · ?? (23)
The economic intuition for these conditions is simply as follows. For a switch
out of the suspension mode to be optimal, it is by (22) necessary that the value
contribution of R&D be non-negative: the additional rate of capital gain ?M¢¤
created by the possibility of leapfrogging the leader in the imminent future must
be at least as large as the ‡ow cost of R&D. For a switch out of the R&D mode to
be optimal, it is by (23) necessary that the value contribution be non-positive.
More to the point, suppose that (?? 1) is outside a given C and we …nd that
?M¢ ¸ ?. Since by ? ¤ = M? ¤ also ?¢¤ ¸ ?, we arrive at a contradiction
indicating that C and the values do not conform to the optimum. Most crucially,
in the absence of hysteresis the su¢ciency implications are operative as well,
so (22) and (23) can be extended to equivalences. The indi¤erence/optimality
condition brought about in Remark 1 then collapses to
¢¤(?) =
?
?
? (24)
This is associated with
C1 =
n
? ¸ 0 : ¢¤(?) ¸ ?
?
o
?
and C0 = ?+ ¡ C1.
Working inside C now breaks (16) and (17) into two systems of Bellman
equations. First,
A?? ¤ + ?? = ?? ¤? (?? ?) = (?? 0) 2 C (25)
and
A??^ ¤ + ?^? = ??^ ¤? (?? ?) = (?? 0) 2 C? (26)
Second,
A?? ¤ + ??+ (?¢¤ ¡ ?) = ?? ¤? (?? ?) = (?? 1) 2 C (27)
and
A??^ ¤ + ?^?¡ ?¢¤ = ??^ ¤? (?? ?) = (?? 1) 2 C? (28)
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Representing absence of arbitrage conditions, the Bellman equations state that
the total rate of return on a …rm must equal the risk free rate under risk neu-
trality. It is also worth noting that the system (27)-(28) is recursive through
¢¤. As the two systems and the C? provide only a general characterisation of
the solution, additional structure in the form of optimality and regularity con-
ditions on the values must be devised in order to close the model. This is done
in what is to follow.
3.2 The solution
The ‡ow of product market pro…ts represents a real underlying asset, as op-
posed to a …nancial asset such as a share of stock. In the well established tax-
onomy of Trigeorgis (1995, pp. 3-4) then, the switching options are (compound
American-style) real options to alter the operating scale. Correspondingly, the
yet unknown ? ¤ and ?^ ¤ represent real options values. Classical contributions
in the same realm include the temporary suspension model of McDonald and
Siegel (1985), the natural resource investment model of Brennan and Schwartz
(1985), the capacity choice model of Pindyck (1988) and the time-to-build model
of Majd and Pindyck (1987).
The general insight of real options analysis is that the discounted cash ‡ow
rules of investment tend to misallocate capital by underestimating or totally ig-
noring the value of operational ‡exibility. Pindyck (1991) provides a prototype
example by studying the optimal timing of an irreversible investment under
idiosyncratic payo¤ uncertainty. The key …nding is that the net present value
(NPV) rule leads to a suboptimally early investment by ignoring the value of
a delaying option as an additional opportunity cost. Along the same lines, the
NPV rule will now be suboptimal since it ignores the switching options. While
the shock di¤uses inside C? the follower keeps the switching option alive in the
fashion of a delaying option. The moment the shock di¤uses from C1 into C1¡?
the follower exercises this option and activates an option to make the converse
switch the moment the shock di¤uses back from C1¡? into C?. Furthermore,
we draw on the investment lag model of Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) to argue
that the optimal R&D rule ?¤ also accounts for an opportunity cost of delaying
speci…c to the role of the suspension option in the presence of technological
uncertainty, as manifested by the (expected) lag between engaging in R&D and
leapfrogging the leader. Namely, the suspension option creates an asymmetry
between the upside and downside risk associated with R&D: while undertak-
ing R&D the follower (?) taps into the upside risk on the incremental product
market pro…ts accrued over the period of technological leadership (referred to
as the leapfrogging rent) while (??) at the same time being protected from the
downside by the suspension option. Put di¤erently, the follower holds opera-
tional ‡exibility to abandon the current R&D undertaking by switching to the
suspension mode in the event that the expected return on the R&D investments
becomes too small relative the expected R&D cost. Running counter to the
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value of delaying, the asymmetry contributes an inducement for R&D in the
form of an additional opportunity cost of delaying.
We develop the analysis in three stages. As the point of departure, the …rm
NPVs and the NPV rule are found in the …rst stage. The NPVs are employed in
the second stage to …nd the optimal R&D rule in the absence of product market
uncertainty, with ? = 0. In the third stage we …nally provide the real options
solution under product market uncertainty. Having done that, we generalise the
analysis by allowing for R&D cost uncertainty also.
NPV rule. Let ?? denote the follower NPV and ?^? denote the leader NPV in
operating mode ?. The particular solutions of the Bellman systems (25)-(26)
and (27)-(28) then yield
??(?) =
(? ¡ ?+ ??)? + ???^
? ¡ ?+ 2??
?
? ¡ ? ¡
? + ??
? + 2??
?
?
?
and
?^?(?) =
(? ¡ ?+ ??)?^ + ???
? ¡ ?+ 2??
?
? ¡ ? ¡
??
? + 2??
?
?
? ??(?)?
Now let ?0 denote the critical shock threshold at which the ?? are equal. Then
?
? ¡ ?+ 2?
¢?0
? ¡ ? ¡
? + ?
? + 2?
?
?
= 0?
which implies
?0 =
? + ?
? + 2?
(? ¡ ?+ 2?)? ¡ ?
?
?
¢
? (29)
The NPV rule calls for undertaking R&D when the shock lies in (?0?1] and for
suspending R&D when the shock lies in (0? ?0).
Optimal management without uncertainty. Let us assume ? = 0 so that
??? = ??????
and A? = ? ??? . Since the shock then grows exponentially at rate ? ? 0, it is
natural to assume there exists a unique threshold ?¤0 distinct from ?0 such that
a switch from the suspension mode to the R&D mode is a one shot occurrence
optimally taking place at the deterministic …rst passage time
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?¤0 = inff? ¸ 0 : ?? ¸ ?¤0g?
It is a standard result that
?¤0 =
8<: ln
³
?
?¤0
´¡ 1?
? ? ? ?¤0
0? ? ¸ ?¤0?
(30)
Hence, the follower value in the suspension mode is given by
Z ?¤0
0
?(?¡?)?????+ ?¡??
¤(?)?1(?¤) =
ÃZ 1
0
?(?¡?)???¡
Z 1
ln(???¤0)
¡ 1?
?(?¡?)???
!
??+
?
? ln
µ
?
?¤0
¶ µ
(? ¡ ?+ ?)? + ??^
? ¡ ?+ 2?
?¤0
? ¡ ? ¡
? + ?
? + 2?
?
?
¶
?
where ? = ?? ? 1. The integral terms account for the pro…ts up until switching
to the R&D mode. With
?
? ln
µ
?
?¤0
¶
=
µ
?
?¤0
¶?
? 1
as a deterministic riskfree discount factor, the remaining term accounts for the
follower value upon the switch. Since the operational ‡exibility to switch back
to the suspension mode is redundant, this value is given by the R&D mode NPV
?1(?¤). Since also
Z 1
0
?(?¡?)??¡
Z 1
¡ 1? ln(???¤0)
?(?¡?)??? =
1
? ¡ ? ¡
µ
?
?¤0
¶?¡1
1
? ¡ ??
we …nd that the follower value is given by
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? ¤(?? ?) =
8>>>><>>>:
??
?¡? +
³
?
?¤0
´? ³
¡ ??¤0?¡? + (?¡?+?)?+??^?¡?+2? ?
¤
0
?¡? ¡ ?+??+2? ??
´
? ? ? ?¤0? ? = 0
M? ¤(?? ?) ? ? ?¤0? ? = 1 or
? ¸ ?¤0? ? = 0
(?¡?+?)?+??^
?¡?+2?
?
?¡? ¡ ?+??+2? ?? ? ? ¸ ?¤0? ? = 1
(31)
Similarly, the leader value is given by
?^ ¤(?? ?) =
8>>>><>>>:
?^?
?¡? +
³
?
?¤0
´? ³
¡ ?^?¤0?¡? + (?¡?+?)?^+???¡?+2? ?
¤
0
?¡? ¡ ??+2? ??
´
? ? ? ?¤0? ? = 0
M?^ ¤(?? ?) ? ? ?¤0? ? = 1 or
? ¸ ?¤0? ? = 0
(?¡?+?)?^+??
?¡?+2?
?
?¡? ¡ ??+2? ?? ? ? ¸ ?¤0? ? = 1?
(32)
By construction, both ? ¤ and ?^ ¤ are continuous around ?¤ so there are no
abrupt value changes upon switching. Subtracting yields
¢¤(?? ?) =
8>>>><>>>>:
¢?
?¡? +
³
?
?¤0
´? ³
¡¢?¤0?¡? + ¢?
¤
0
?¡?+2? +
?
?+2?
´
? ? ? ?¤0? ? = 0
M¢(?? ?) ? ? ?¤0? ? = 1 or
? ¸ ?¤0? ? = 0
¢?
?¡?+2? +
?
?+2? ? ¸ ?¤0? ? = 1?
(33)
Hence, the indi¤erence/optimality condition (24) becomes
¢?¤0
? ¡ ?+ 2? +
?
? + 2?
=
?
?
? (34)
which implies
?¤0 =
? + ?
? + 2?
? ¡ ?+ 2?
?
?
¢
? (35)
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By use of ?¤0 we can write
? ¤(?? ?) =
8>>><>>:
??
?¡? + ?
+(?)? ? ? ?¤0? ? = 0
M? ¤(?? ?) ? ? ?¤0? ? = 1 or
? ¸ ?¤0? ? = 0
(?¡?+?)?+??^
?¡?+2?
?
?¡? ¡ ?+??+2? ?? ? ? ¸ ?¤0? ? = 1
(36)
and
?^ ¤(?? ?) =
8>>><>>>:
?^?
?¡? + ?^
¡(?)? ? ? ?¤0? ? = 0
M?^ ¤(?? ?) ? ? ?¤0? ? = 1 or
? ¸ ?¤0? ? = 0
(?¡?+?)?^+??
?¡?+2?
?
?¡? ¡ ?+??+2? ?? ? ? ¸ ?¤0? ? = 1
(37)
where
? +(?) =
µ
?
?¤0
¶?
1
?
?
? ¡ ? + 2?
¢?¤0
? ¡ ? ¸ 0?
and
?^ ¡(?) = ¡
µ
?
?¤0
¶? µ
¢?¤0
? ¡ ? ¡
?
?
¶
+ ? +(?) · 0?
Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that (34) equivalent to an explicit …rst-
order condition.
Remark 2 De…ne a threshold ~? and for ? ? ~? the function
?(?? ~?) =
ÃZ 1
0
?(?¡?)???¡
Z 1
¡ 1? ln(?~?)
?(?¡?)???
!
??+
³?
~?
´? µ(? ¡ ?+ ?)? + ??^
? ¡ ? + 2?
~?
? ¡ ? ¡
? + ?
? + 2?
?
?
¶
?
By de…nition then
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? ¤(?) = sup
~?
?(?? ~?)?
The …rst order condition ???~? = 0 (for all ? ? ~?) yields
~?¤ =
?
? ¡ 1?0 =
?
? ¡ 1
? + ?
? + 2?
(? ¡ ? + 2?)? ¡ ?
?
?
¢
? (38)
which satis…es the second order condition ?
2 ~?
?~?2 (~?
¤) · 0 as well. Since
?
? ¡ 1 =
?
? ¡ ??
we also have ?¤0 = ~?¤ which shows that (34) is equivalent to explicitly maximis-
ing the follower value with respect to the switching trigger. The maximisation
(and hence (34)) is also equivalent to the high contact condition of dynamic
programming that the follower value be smooth around the switching trigger.
From (38) we notice that ?¤0 is increased above the NPV threshold by a
markup in ?. This markup accounts for ? +, the option premium (value of de-
laying) associated with the optimal one shot switch at time ?¤0. The presence of
? + renders the follower value convex in the shock for ? ? ?¤0. Ordinary di¤eren-
tiation further veri…es that the follower value is smooth around ?¤0 as required
by dynamic programming optimality considerations. The shape exhibited by
the leader value emerges frequently in dynamic oligopoly models for …rms op-
erating under the threat that a one shot investment made a competitor triggers
a discontinuous drop in the expected future pro…ts. Such models include, for
example, Smets (1991) and Weeds (2002). Firstly, for ? ? ?¤0 the leader value
is rendered concave by ?^ ¡, the value loss caused by the threat of switching.
More speci…cally, the leader value increases less than linearly with the shock
since the positive e¤ect on the NPV is countered by the fact that switching
and the associated discontinuous drop in the NPV become more imminent as
the shock draws closer to ?¤0. Secondly, the leader value is kinked around ?¤0
since under one shot switching ?¤0 acts as a …rst hitting boundary instead of a
transitional boundary in the sense of Dixit (1993, pp. 212-213). The two values
are illustrated by Figure 1.
Optimal management under uncertainty. Let us next extend the analysis by
allowing for product market uncertainty through the assumption 0 ? ? ? ?max.
Extending from the above, we facilitate the analysis with the following basic
notions:
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Figure 1: follower and leader values without uncertainty
1. Based on the absence of hysteresis and the positive persistence of uncer-
tainty exhibited by the shock (eg. Dixit and Pindyck 1994, pp. 128-129)1 ,
we assume/guess there exists a unique switching trigger ?¤ distinct from ?¤0
that de…nes C0 and C1 as non-overlapping connected intervals C0 = [0? ?¤)
and C1 = [?¤?1]. Moreover, ?¤ is of the multiplicative form
?¤ = ?(?)
?
¢
?
By use of an indicator function the optimal R&D rule may be de…ned as
?¤(?) = 1?¸?¤(?)?
2. In both operating modes the follower value ? ¤ is increased above the
NPV by a convex option premium. We denote the premium in mode
? by ? +? . The interaction between the two premia is accounted for by
?(?). The relationship between ?(?) and the multiplier ?+??+2? (?¡?+ 2?)
in ?¤0 is a priori unclear. Particularly, it is possible that the irreversible
investment prediction of uncertainty delaying investment is turned over by
option interaction, or the interaction between the value of delaying and
the opportunity cost of delaying.
3. In the suspension mode the leader value ?^ ¤ is decreased below the NPV
by a value loss caused be the threat of the follower switching to the R&D
mode. Conversely, in the R&D mode ?^ ¤ is increased above the NPV by
a value gain created by the possibility of the follower switching to the
suspension mode.
1That is, a higher current shock value shifts the cumulative probability distribution of
future values (and thereby the distribution of future leapfrogging rents) uniformly to the
right. This property is also referred to as …rst order stochastic dominance (e.g. Sjodal 1997).
21
4. Since the shock di¤uses stochastically, ?¤ acts as a transitional boundary
(reversible switching point) instead of a …rst hitting boundary.
We attack the problem of …nding the triplet ? ¤? ?^ ¤? ?¤ by applying an indi-
rect solution strategy as follows. First, letting
§¤(?) = ? ¤(?) + ?^ ¤(?)?
and noting that
? ¤(?) =
§¤(?) ¡ ¢¤(?)
2
? (39)
and
?^ ¤(?) =
§¤(?) + ¢¤(?)
2
? (40)
we replace the additional optimality and regularity conditions on ? ¤ and ?^ ¤
with their equivalents on ¢¤ and §¤. With the triplet ¢¤?§¤? ?¤ then found,
we solve for ? ¤ and ?^ ¤ by direct substitution. This strategy is instrumental
as it gets rid o¤ mathematical clutter and enables us to employ the indi¤er-
ence/optimality condition ¢¤(?¤) = ?? as an integral part of the analysis.
From the Bellman system (25)-(28), we …nd that §¤ is of the form
§¤(?? ?) =
8>><>>>:
§¤0(?)? ? = 0? ? ? ?¤
M§¤(?? ?)? ? = 1? ? ? ?¤ or
? = 0? ? ¸ ?¤
§¤1(?)? ? = 1? ? ¸ ?¤?
(41)
where the §¤? satisfy
A?§¤? ¡ ?§¤? + §?¡ ?? = 0? (42)
Hence,
§¤0(?) = ?1?
?+ + ?2??
¡
+
§?
? ¡ ?? (43)
and
22
§¤1(?) = ?1?
?+ + ?2??
¡
+
§?
? ¡ ? ¡
?
?
? (44)
where ?+ is the positive root and ?¡ is the negative root of the characteristic
polynomial ?2?(? ¡ 1) + 2?? ¡ 2? = 0:
?§ =
µ
1
2
¡ ?
?2
¶
§
sµ
1
2
¡ ?
?2
¶2
+ 2
?
?2
?
Similarly, ¢¤ is of the form
¢¤(?? ?) =
8>>><>>:
¢¤0(?)? ? = 0? ? ? ?¤
M¢¤(?? ?)? ? = 1? ? ? ?¤ or
? = 0? ? ¸ ?¤
¢¤1(?)? ? = 1? ? ¸ ?¤?
(45)
where the ¢¤? satisfy the Bellman equations
A?¢¤? ¡ (? + 2??)¢¤? + ¢?+ ?? = 0? (46)
Hence,
¢¤0(?) = ?3?
?+ + ?4??
¡
+
¢?
? ¡ ?? (47)
and
¢¤1(?) = ?3?
?+(?) + ?4??
¡(?) +
¢?
? ¡ ?+ 2? +
?
? + 2?
? (48)
where ?+(?) is the positive root and ?¡(?) is the negative root of the charac-
teristic polynomial ?2?(?¡ 1) + 2?? ¡ 2(? + 2?) = 0:
?§(?) =
µ
1
2
¡ ?
?2
¶
§
sµ
1
2
¡ ?
?2
¶2
+ 2
? + 2?
?2
?
By direct inspection, ?+(?) ? ?+ and ?¡(?) ? ?¡ for all ? ? 0.
We now state the additional optimality and regularity conditions as follows:
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1. The smoothness of values: both ? ¤ and ?^ ¤ must be continuously di¤eren-
tiable around ?¤. Since this is equivalent to §¤ and ¢¤ being continuously
di¤erentiable around ?¤, we have the pair value matching conditions
§¤?(?
¤) = §¤1¡?(?
¤)? (49)
and
¢¤?(?
¤) = ¢¤1¡?(?
¤)? (50)
in conjunction with the pair of high contact conditions
?§¤?
??
(?¤) =
?§¤1¡?
??
(?¤)? (51)
and
?¢¤?
??
(?¤) =
?¢¤1¡?
??
(?¤)? (52)
2. The values must vanish with the shock: ? ¤ ! 0 and ?^ ¤ ! 0 as ? ! 0.
From (43) and (47), this is equivalent to the regularity conditions
?1??
+
+ ?2??
¡ ! 0? (53)
and
?3??
+
+ ?4??
¡ ! 0? (54)
as ? ! 0. In addition, both ? ¤and ?^ ¤ must satisfy a no bubbles condition
ruling out explosive growth as ? ! +1. From (44) and (48), this is
equivalent to the regularity conditions
?1??
+
+ ?2??
¡ ! 0? (55)
and
?3??
+(?) + ?4??
¡(?) ! 0? (56)
as ? ! 1?
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3. Bang-bang conditions: ? ¤ and ?^ ¤ must satisfy the indi¤erence/optimality
condition ¢¤(?¤) = ?? in conjunction with
¢¤(?) ?
?
?
? (57)
for all ? ? ?¤ and
¢¤(?) ?
?
?
? (58)
for all ? ? ?¤.
The bang bang conditions (57) and (58) cannot be a priori imposed, nor
are they implied by the other conditions. Hence, with ¢¤?§¤? ?¤ found, we
must verify whether ¢¤ is well behaving such that (57) and (58) are indeed
satis…ed. Should ¢¤ violate (57) by dropping below ?? somewhere above ?
¤
or violate (58) by raising above ?? somewhere below ?
¤, the solution hand at
hand makes no economic sense whatsoever and we conclude that no solution
for the problem exists. The smoothness of the follower value around ?¤ is
due to the condition that an optimal performance function be stochastically
?2 in the continuation domain with respect to the driving Itô di¤usion (eg.
Vollert, 2003, pp. 67-68). Basically, an optimal performance function on an Itô
di¤usion must be ?2 inside the continuation domain (now in the interiors of the
C?) and smooth on the boundary of this domain, a set of zero measure (now
the point ?¤). The economic intuition for the smoothness can be derived from
heuristic arbitrage considerations or from optimality considerations ruling out
value function kinks around optimal investment thresholds, as demonstrated by
Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 130-132). The smoothness of the leader value, on
the other hand, is due to the condition that value functions be smooth around
transitional boundaries on which the parameters of the driving process and/or
the ‡ow payo¤ function experience a change (Dixit, 1993, pp. 30-31). This is
easiest veri…ed by inspecting the Bellman equations for §¤, as condensed by
(42). Since the (net) ‡ow payo¤ switching between §? and §? ¡ ? is the only
change experienced by these equations at ?¤, it is immediate that §¤ is smooth
around ?¤. Since also ?^ ¤ = §¤ ¡? ¤ and ? ¤ is smooth around ?¤, we have that
?^ ¤ is smooth around ?¤ as well. The regularity conditions (53) and (54) are
due to the absorbing barrier property of ? = 0: should the shock ever hit zero,
it will stay there forever, thereby rendering the product market and the …rms
worthless. The no bubble conditions (55) and (55) imply that the suspension
option premium ? +1 and the value gain ?^
+
1 vanish as suspension becomes an
extremely remote possibility:
? +1 (?) ! 0?
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and
?^ +1 (?) ! 0?
as ? ! +1.
By (53)-(56), the coe¢cients ?2? ?4? ?1 and ?3 all equal zero. An application
of (50) together with ¢¤(?¤) = ?? then yields
¢¤0(?) =
¢?
? ¡ ? +
³ ?
?¤
´?+ µ
¡ ¢?
¤
? ¡ ? +
?
?
¶
?
and
¢¤1(?) =
¢?
? ¡ ?+ 2? +
?
? + 2?
+
³ ?
?¤
´?¡(?) µ
¡ ¢?
¤
? ¡ ?+ 2? ¡
?
? + 2?
+
?
?
¶
?
Similarly, an application of (49) yields
§¤0(?) =
§?
? ¡ ? +
³ ?
?¤
´?+ µ
¡ §?
? ¡ ? + §
¤¤
¶
?
and
§¤1(?) =
§?
? ¡ ? ¡
?
?
+
³ ?
?¤
´?¡ µ
¡ §?
¤
? ¡ ? +
?
?
+ §¤¤
¶
?
where §¤¤ is the total value upon switching, §¤(?¤). Solving (51) for it yields
§¤¤ =
§?¤
? ¡ ? +
?¡
?+ ¡ ?¡
?
?
?
Solving (52) for ?¤ …nally yields the proposed multiplicative form
?¤ = ?(?)
?
¢
? (59)
with
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?(?) =
?(?) ?+??+2? ¡ ?
(?(?) ¡ 1) ?¡??¡?+2? ¡ (? ¡ 1)
? ¡ ?
?
?
where we have abbreviated ?(?) = ?¡(?) and ? = ?+. From ? ? 1 it follows
that ?(?) ? 0 for all parameter con…gurations. Since also ?(?) ! ¡1 and
? ! ?? as ? ! 0, an application of the l’Hôpital rule yields
?(?) ! ? + ?
? + 2?
? ¡ ?+ 2?
?
?
as ? ! 0. This veri…es that ?¤0 arises as a limiting case of ?¤.
Substituting the obtained §¤? and ¢¤? into (41) and (45) yields
§¤(?? ?) =
8>>><>>>>:
§?
?¡? +
¡ ?
?¤
¢? ³¡ §??¡? + ?¡?+¡?¡ ??´ ? ? = 0? ? ? ?¤
M§¤(?? ?)? ? = 1? ? ? ?¤ or
? = 0? ? ¸ ?¤
§?
?¡? ¡ ?? +
¡ ?
?¤
¢?¡ ³¡ §?¤?¡? + ?+?+¡?¡ ??´ ? ? = 1? ? ¸ ?¤
(60)
and
¢¤(?? ?) =
8>>><>>>>:
¢?
?¡? +
¡ ?
?¤
¢? ³¡¢?¤?¡? + ??´ ? ? = 0? ? ? ?¤
M¢¤(?? ?)? ? = 1? ? ? ?¤ or
? = 0? ? ¸ ?¤
¢?
?¡?+2? +
?
?+2? +
¡ ?
?¤
¢?(?) ³¡ ¢?¤?¡?+2? + ?+??+2? ??´ ? ? = 1? ? ¸ ?¤?
(61)
Let us now turn to the bang bang conditions (57) and (58). We …nd from
(61) that the properties of ¢ allow a lower boundary restriction for ?(?) under
which these conditions are concomitantly satis…ed. This result is stated by the
following lemma.
Lemma 1 For ¢¤ to be well behaving such that the bang bang conditions (57)
and (58) are concomitantly satis…ed, it is su¢cient and necessary that ¢¤ has
a non-negative slope around ?¤. The condition for the non-negative slope is
?(?) ¸ ?min(?)?
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where
?min(?) =
?(?)
?(?) ¡ 1
? + ?
? + 2?
(? ¡ ?+ 2?)?
Proof. Di¤erentiating ¢¤ = ¢¤1 with respect to ? yields
?¢¤
??
=
¢
? ¡ ?+ 2? + ?(?)
³ ?
?¤
´?(?) µ
¡ ¢
? ¡ ?+ 2?
?¤
?
+
? + ?
? + 2?
?
?
1
?
¶
? (62)
Evaluating this at ?¤ we …nd that
?¢¤
??
(?¤) ¸ 0 , ?(?) ¸ ?min(?)?
which is the proposed non-negative slope condition. Assume that this condition
holds. Then
¡ ¢?
¤
? ¡ ? + 2? +
? + ?
? + 2?
?
?
¸ ¡ 1
?(?)
¢?¤
? ¡ ?+ 2??
which on substitution into (62) yields
?¢¤
??
¸ ¢
? ¡ ? + 2? ¡
³ ?
?¤
´?(?)¡1 ¢
? ¡ ? + 2? ? 0?
for all ? ? ?¤. We have shown that a non-negative slope in the right neighbour-
hood of ?¤ implies a positive slope for all ? ? ?¤. This proves the su¢ciency
claim for (57). In order to prove the su¢ciency claim for (58), we note that
by smoothness ?(?) ¸ ?min(?) concomitantly implies a non-negative slope in
the left neighbourhood of ?¤ and that this (from di¤erentiating ¢¤0) implies a
positive slope for all ? ? ?¤. The necessity claims being trivial, we are done.
Lemma 1 establishes ?(?) ¸ ?min(?) as a condition under which the obtained
triplet ¢¤?§¤? ?¤ constitutes a unique solution to the problem. We denote the
implied part of the (?? ?? ?? ?)-space by W . Outside W it is not possible to
enforce all the valuation conditions associated with the assumption/guess that
the C? are non-overlapping connected intervals separated by a unique switching
trigger. Naturally, the question arises whether alternative solutions can be found
outside W by departing from a di¤erent assumption. Overlapping is ruled out by
the absence of hysteresis. The possibility of the C? being formed by disconnected
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intervals is ruled out by the positive persistence of uncertainty exhibited by the
shock. Speci…cally, since the expected return on the R&D investments increases
monotonously with the current shock value, at optimum it cannot be the case
that the follower starts R&D for some shock value and then goes ahead to
suspend R&D for a larger value. All in all, we conclude that outside W there
exists no solutions and particularly that the only solution is the one obtained,
inside W. In this light, Lemma 1 can be seen as an ’existence result’in the
presence of product market uncertainty. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate ¢¤ inside
and outside W.
Noting from the respective characteristic polynomials that
?(?) ¡ 1 = (? + 2?) ¡ ??(?)1
2?2?(?)
?
and
? ¡ 1 = ? ¡ ??1
2
?2?
?
the de…nition of W expands to read
W =
½
(?? ?? ?? ?) : ?2(?)
? + ?
? + 2?
? ¡ ?+ 2?
? ¡ ??(?) + 2? · ?
2 ? ¡ ?
? ¡ ??
¾
? (63)
The ?-term is positive since ? ? ?? for all ? ? 0. Moreover, since we can show
that the ?(?)-term increases monotonously in ?, the de…nition can be condensed
as
? · ?max?
with ?max implicitly solving
?2(?max)
? + ?max
? + 2?max
? ¡ ?+ 2?max
? ¡ ??(?max) + 2?max = ?
2 ? ¡ ?
? ¡ ?? ? (64)
Hence, an optimal R&D rule exists under product market uncertainty provided
that the expected leapfrogging frequency in the R&D mode is su¢ciently low. In
valuation terms this means that there must be su¢cient distinction between the
leader and the follower. Since ? = ?? and ?(?) =
?+2?
? for ? = 0, we also verify
from (64) that a solution then exists for all ?. To get an idea of its magnitude,
Table 2 displays ?max for selected levels of ? when (?? ?) = (0?05? 0?03).
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? ?max
0?01 0?023
0?05 0?026
0?1 0?036
0?15 0?050
0?2 0?069
Table 2: the e¤ect of ? on ?max
Equipped with W, we …nally summarise the main result of the analysis in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume that (?? ?? ?? ?) 2 W. The optimal R&D rule for a …rm
in the follower position is then
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?¤(?) = 1?¸?¤(?)?
where the switching trigger ?¤ is given by
?¤ =
?(?) ?+??+2? ¡ ?
(?(?) ¡ 1) ?¡??¡?+2? ¡ (? ¡ 1)
? ¡ ?
?
?
¢
?
Outside W there does not exist an optimal rule.
Substituting (60) and (61) into (39) and (40), we …nd that the associated
follower and leader values are given by
? ¤(?? ?) =
8>>>>><>>>>>>:
??
?¡? +
1
2
¡ ?
?¤
¢? ³¡ ?¡?¡?¡ ?? ¡ ¢?¤?¡? + ??´ ? ? = 0? ? ? ?¤
M? ¤(?? ?)? ? = 1? ? ? ?¤ or
? = 0? ? ¸ ?¤
(?¡?+?)?+??^
?¡?+2?
?
?¡? ¡ ?+??+2? ?? ¡ 12
¡ ?
?¤
¢?¡ ?
?¡?¡
?
?+
1
2
¡ ?
?¤
¢?(?) ³¡ ¢?¤?¡?+2? ¡ ?+??+2??´ ? ? = 1? ? ¸ ?¤?
and
?^ ¤(?? ?) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
?^?
?¡? +
1
2
¡ ?
?¤
¢? ³ ?¡
?¡?¡
?
? ¡ ¢?
¤
?¡? +
?
?
´
? ? = 0? ? ? ?¤
M?^ ¤(?? ?)? ? = 1? ? ? ?¤ or
? = 0? ? ¸ ?¤
(?¡?+?)?^+??
?¡?+2?
?
?¡? +
?
?+2?
?
? +
1
2
¡ ?
?¤
¢?¡ ?
?¡?¡
?
?+
1
2
¡ ?
?¤
¢?(?) ³¡ ¢?¤?¡?+2? ¡ ?+??+2??´ ? ? = 1? ? ¸ ?¤?
The nonlinear components in ? ¤ represent the option premia ? +? . The two
values exhibit the same shapes (in ?-space) as in Figure 1, with the one exception
that ?^ ¤ is smooth by the transitional boundary argument. Since ?¤ is linear
in ?, the values are also linear homogenous in (?? ?). Adopting the subscript
notation in the fashion of ¢¤? and §¤?, we can hence write
? ¤? (?? ?) = ??
¤
?
³?
?
´
?
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and
?^ ¤? (?? ?) = ??^
¤
?
³?
?
´
?
where the ?¤? and ?^¤? are the functions to be determined. As suggested by the
analysis of McDonald and Siegel (1986), linear homogeneity enables an extension
towards R&D cost uncertainty (two dimensional uncertainty) such that a closed
form solution for the optimal rule can still be obtained through a reduction of
dimensionality (see also Dixit and Pindyck 1994, pp. 207-212).
Extension: R&D cost uncertainty. Let us suppose the ‡ow R&D cost is driven
by a geometric Brownian motion
??? = ~?????+ ~???? ~??? ?0 = ??
where ? ~?? is the increment of another standard Brownian motion, the di¤usion
coe¢cient ~? measures the degree of volatility in the R&D input market an and ~?
is the di¤erence between riskree rate of return and the equilibrium rate of return
shortfall on the cost. Potential correlation between product market and R&D
input market ‡uctuations is allowed for by a covariance coe¢cient ? 2 [¡1? 1].
The expectation of ???? ~?? is correspondingly given by ???.
The R&D and suspension regions are separated in (?? ?)-space by a trigger
curve along which the follower is indi¤erent between the two operating modes.
By linear homogeneity, a free boundary problem is averted as this curve is
de…ned by the ray
?¤(?) = ?¤??
where the slope ?¤ is a positive scalar constituting a trigger level for the ratio
process
?? =
??
??
?
When the shock is su¢ciently large or/and the ‡ow cost is su¢ciently small such
that the ratio exceeds ?¤, it is optimal to continue in the R&D more or switch
immediately out of the suspension mode. Formally, the R&D region reduces to
one dimension as
C1 = f? ¸ ?¤g?
and the optimal rule as ?¤(?) = 1?¸?¤(?).
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Since the solution strategy for ?¤ basically replicates that for ?¤, we only
highlight the main steps. First noticing that any twice di¤erentiable function
?(?? ?) = ??(?)
satis…es
??
??
=
??
??
?
??
??
= ? ¡ ? ??
??
?
and
?2?
??2
=
1
?
?2?
??2
?
?2?
??2
=
?2
?
?2?
??2
?
we can show that the counterpart of the Bellman system (25)-(26) reads as
1
2
?(?)?2
?2?¤
??2
+ (?¡ ~?)? ??
¤
??
¡ (? ¡ ~?)?¤ + ?(?^¤ ¡ ?¤) + ?? ¡ 1 = 0? (65)
and
1
2
?(?)?2
?2?^¤
??2
+ (?¡ ~?)? ??^
¤
??
¡ (? ¡ ~?)?^¤ ¡ ?(?^¤ ¡ ?¤) + ?^? = 0? (66)
where ?(?) = ?2 ¡ 2??~? + ~?2 ? 0. Similarly, the counterpart of (27)-(28) reads
as
1
2
?(?)?2
?2?¤
??2
+ (?¡ ~?)? ??
¤
??
¡ (? ¡ ~?)?¤ + ?? = 0? (67)
and
1
2
?(?)?2
?2?^¤
??2
+ (?¡ ~?)? ??^
¤
??
¡ (? ¡ ~?)?¤ + ?^? = 0? (68)
Now reusing notation as ¢¤(?) = ?^¤(?) ¡ ?¤(?) and §¤(?) = ?^¤(?) + ?¤(?), the
indirect value matching conditions along ?¤(?) become
¢¤?(?
¤) = ¢¤1¡?(?
¤)?
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and
§¤?(?
¤) = §¤1¡?(?
¤)?
The high contact conditions with respect to ? become
?¢¤?
??
(?¤) =
?¢¤1¡?
??
(?¤)?
and
?§¤?
??
(?¤) =
?§¤1¡?
??
(?¤)?
The additional high contact conditions with respect to ? become
¢¤?(?
¤) ¡ ?¤ ?¢
¤
?
??
(?¤) = ¢¤1¡?(?
¤) ¡ ?¤ ?¢
¤
1¡?
??
(?¤)?
and
§¤?(?
¤) ¡ ?¤ ?§
¤
?
??
(?¤) = §¤1¡?(?
¤) ¡ ?¤ ?§
¤
1¡?
??
(?¤)?
For both ¢¤ and §¤ any of the three conditions can be dropped as an implication
of the other two. Adding the bang bang condition ?¢¤(?¤) = 1, this leaves us
with …ve conditions. Imposing also the four regularity conditions pertaining to
the limiting cases ? ! 0 and ? ! 1 (so the number of unknowns is matched),
we …nd that
?¤ =
?(?) ?¡~?+??¡~?+2? ¡ ?
(?(?) ¡ 1) ?¡??¡?+2? ¡ (? ¡ 1)
? ¡ ?
?
1
¢
?
where
?(?) =
µ
1
2
¡ ?¡ ~?
?(?)
¶
¡
sµ
1
2
¡ ?¡ ~?
?(?)
¶2
+ 2
? ¡ ~?+ 2?
?(?)
? 0?
and
? =
µ
1
2
¡ ?¡ ~?
?(?)
¶
+
sµ
1
2
¡ ?¡ ~?
?(?)
¶2
+ 2
? ¡ ~?
?(?)
? 1?
as implied by the respective characteristic polynomials.
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4 Comparative statics
We now gain further insight into the optimal R&D rule by investigating the
comparative statics properties of ?¤ and ?¤. By direct inspection, it is clear that
these triggers display the same properties with respect to the shared parameters
?? ?? ? and ?. This noted, we focus primarily on the simpler ?¤.
Product market uncertainty. Given the asymmetry of the shock distribution, we
isolate the e¤ect of product market uncertainty on ?¤ by way of two distribution
spreads that preserve distinct measures of central tendency: mean preserving
spreads (in the spirit of Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970) and median preserving
spreads. Since E??? = ????, a mean preserving spread is obtained by increasing
?. Since the median of ?? on the other hand is ???? with ? = ?¡ 12?2, a median
preserving spread is obtained by increasing ? (the rate of return shortfall ?)
concomitantly with ? according to
??
??
= ?? (69)
Let us start from a mean preserving spread. The respective characteristic
polynomials imply
??
??
= ??(?; ?)? (70)
and
??
??
= ??(?; ?)? (71)
where
?(?;?) = ¡?(?¡ 1)
?2?+ ?
? (72)
These di¤erentials account for two opposite e¤ects on the optimal rule. On one
hand, there is a positive e¤ect on ?¤ since the value of delaying increases when
the return on the R&D investments becomes more variable. Technically, since
the premium on the option to switch to the R&D mode is convex in the shock,
it increases as an implication of Jensen’s Inequality. On the other hand, there
is a negative e¤ect since also the opportunity cost of delaying increases. While
the increase in the value of delaying re‡ects the well known bad news principle
of Bernanke (1983), the increase in the opportunity cost re‡ects what could be
called ’a good news principle’: an increase in ? renders R&D investments more
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attractive since under the downside protection (an asymmetry between upside
and downside risk on the leapfrogging rent) the expected return on these invest-
ments goes up together with the likelihood of extreme shock values. Overall,
we …nd that ?¤ is a non-monotonous function of ?. Moreover, a comparison
to the certainty trigger ?¤0 in (35) reveals that the absence of product market
uncertainty always acts as a deterrent for R&D investments. These results are
stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique threshold volatility ?0 2 (0? ?max) implic-
itly solving
?(?;?0)
?(?)
=
?(?;?0)
?(?) ¡ 2?? (73)
with
?(?) = (? + ?+ 2?)?¡ 2(? + ?)?
such that
??¤
??
(
?
?
)
0 for ?
(
?
?
)
?0?
Moreover, in the presence of product market uncertainty R&D investments are
always more attractive than in the absence of product market volatility:
?¤ ? ?¤0?
for all ? · ?max.
Proof. By ordinary di¤erentiation, (73) follows from ??
¤
?? =
??
??
?
¢ and
??
??
=
?
(? ¡ ?+ 2?)(? + 2?)
(?(?) ¡ 2?)?(?? ?) ¡ ?(?)?(???)h
(?(?) ¡ 1) ?¡??¡?+2? ¡ (? ¡ 1)
i2 (? ¡ ?)?
The LHS of (73) increases monotonously for all ? · ?max and goes to zero as
? ! 0. The RHS, on other hand, decreases monotonously and goes to +1 as
? ! 0. In addition, the LHS is larger than the RHS for ? = ?max. Hence,
?0 2 (0? ?max) exists and is unique. For showing ?¤ ? ?¤0, it now su¢ces to
verify that ?¤ ? ?¤0 for ? = ?max, or that
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?(?) ?+??+2? ¡ ?
(?(?) ¡ 1) ?¡??¡?+2? ¡ (? ¡ 1)
(? ¡ ?) ? ? + ?
? + 2?
(? ¡ ?+ 2?)? (74)
for ? = ?max. Evaluating ?(?) and ? for ? = ?max yields
? =
r
?
?
?
and
?(?) = ¡
s
? + 2?
?
?
Substituting these and simplifying, we …nd that (74) is satis…ed if
r
?
?
?
1
2
+
?
?
?
But this holds true trivially for all ?? ¸ 0, so we are done.
Proposition 2 establishes a U-shaped relationship between the attractiveness
of R&D investments and mean preserving increases in product market uncer-
tainty. This is illustrated by Figure 4. When ? = ?0 the e¤ects on the value
of delaying and on the opportunity cost of delaying cancel each other out. On
the downward sloping part (0? ?0) the e¤ect on the opportunity cost dominates
whereas on the upward sloping part (?0? ?max) there is su¢cient uncertainty for
the e¤ect on the value delaying to take over. At this juncture, it is worth point-
ing out that the implications of uncertainty for the short run R&D activity and
technological progress are not directly inferable from the U-shaped relationship
since the speed at which the shock tends towards (or away from) a given level
is inversely related to ? through ?. For elaborating on this point, let us de…ne
the …rst passage time
?¤ = inff? ¸ 0 : ?? ¸ ?¤g?
It is a standard result (eg. Øksendal 2003, p. 125) that
E??¤ =
8<:
1
? ln
³
?¤
?
´
? ? ? ?¤
0? ? ¸ ?¤?
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Figure 4: ?¤ and mean preserving increases in uncertainy
Letting ? = 0 yields the ?¤0 in (30) as a special case. The coe¢cient
1
? accounts
for the speed at which the shock tends towards ?¤. When ? lies in (?0? ?max)
the positive e¤ect on ?¤ is compounded by the speed e¤ect so higher uncertainty
is detrimental to the expected short run R&D activity. When ? lies in (0? ?0)
the speed e¤ect and the e¤ect on ?¤ work to the opposite directions so the
relationship between uncertainty and the expected short run R&D activity is
ambiguous. Speci…cally, the speed e¤ect takes over when the switch out of the
suspension mode is a su¢ciently remote possibility (? is small relative to ?¤)
Next turning a median preserving spread by use of (69), we …nd that the
U-shaped relationship does not carry over as ?¤ becomes a monotonously de-
creasing function of ?. This result is stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The optimal switching trigger is a monotonously decreasing
function of median preserving increases in product market uncertainty: con-
ditional on (69),
??¤
??
? 0?
for all ? · ?max.
Proof. Conditional on (69), ordinary di¤erentiation yields
??
??
=
?
(? ¡ ?+ 2?)(? + 2?)
(?(?) ¡ 2?)?(?;?) ¡ ?(?)?(?; ?) + ?0h
(?(?) ¡ 1) ?¡??¡?+2? ¡ (? ¡ 1)
i2 (? ¡ ?)?
where ? has simpli…ed from (72) to
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?(?;?) = ¡ ?
2
?2?+ ?
?
and
?0 =
(? + 2?)? ¡ (? + ?)?(?)
?
·
? ¡ ?
? ¡ ?+ 2?(?(?) ¡ 1) ¡
? ¡ ?+ 2?
? ¡ ? (? ¡ 1)
¸
?
The problem is to show that the denominator
(?(?) ¡ 2?)?(?;?) ¡ ?(?)?(?; ?) + ?0 ? 0? (75)
As the procedure is quite elaborate, also invoking the de…nition of W, it is
presented in Appendix A.
Proposition 3 establishes an important qualitative distinction between a
mean preserving increase and a median preserving increase in product market
uncertainty, stating the latter always renders R&D investments more attrac-
tive. Technically, there does not exist a counterpart for ?0. This is illustrated
by Figure 5. The economic intuition for the monotonous relationship derives
from (69) as follows. Relative to a mean preserving increase, a median preserv-
ing increase entails a more pronounced opportunity cost of delaying since the
expected return on the R&D investments goes up together with ? (is inversely
related to ?). What is more, the e¤ect on the opportunity cost now dominates
the e¤ect on the value of delaying across all ?, so the U-shape is abolished. Since
the speed e¤ect is eliminated, we go on to conclude that a median preserving
increase tends to boost R&D activity and technological progress in the short
run.
Unfortunately, the shock properties do not allow an economically interesting
long run analysis (in the absence of re‡ecting barriers). Speci…cally, for all ? ?
?max the expected relative occupation time of the shock above ?¤ approaches
unity as the time horizon approaches in…nity. For related discussion on long
run stationary distributions, we refer to Dixit (1993, pp. 58-69) and Dixit and
Pindyck (1994, pp. 83-84).
R&D cost uncertainty. The e¤ect of mean preserving increases in R&D cost
uncertainty is accounted for by ?(?) and ? in ?¤. It is clear from ?(?) that these
increases work to the same direction as those in product market uncertainty2 .
2 It is worth noting from
???
??
= (~?2 + ?¡ ~?)??+ (???? ¡ ~?? ~?? ¡ ?~????? ~??)
that mean preserving increases in ? and ~? do not preserve the mean of the ratio.
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Figure 5: ?¤ and median preserving increases in uncertainy
The economic intuition goes along the same lines also. On one hand, the value of
delaying increases with ~? since the net return on the R&D investments becomes
more variable. On the other hand, the opportunity cost of delaying increases
as well under the downside protection. Speci…cally, while undertaking R&D the
follower taps into the upside risk on the shock-cost ratio (upside risk on the
shock and downside risk on the cost) while at the same time being protected
from the downside by the suspension option. Overall, we conclude that the
relationship between ?¤ and mean preserving increases in ~? replicates the U-
shape of Figure 4. Finally, we also see from ?(?) that a positive ? dampens
the e¤ect of ? and ~?. This re‡ects the fact that higher covariance between two
stochastic processes implies lower variability over their ratio.
Technological uncertainty. The e¤ect of technological uncertainty manifests it-
self through the expected leapfrogging lag
? =
1
?
?
This noted, we rewrite the switching trigger as
?¤ =
?(?) ??+1??+2 ¡ ?
(?(?) ¡ 1) (?¡?)?(?¡?)?+2 ¡ (? ¡ 1)
(? ¡ ?)? ?
¢
? (76)
with
?(?) = ?
µ
1
?
¶
=
µ
1
2
¡ ?
?2
¶
¡
sµ
1
2
¡ ?
?2
¶2
+ 2
??+ 2
?2?
? 0? (77)
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The characteristic polynomial ?2??(?¡ 1) + 2??? ¡ 2(??+ 2) = 0 implies
??
??
= ¡ 2
?
?¡
1
2
(??)2 + ?
¢
? + 2
? 0? (78)
We also notice that ? ? ?max is replaced with ? ? ?min = 1?max
An increase in ? (’time to build’) has four e¤ects. Firstly, there is the obvious
positive e¤ect on ?¤ due to the fact that the expected R&D costs until leapfrog-
ging go up. Secondly, since the (expected) variance over the return on the R&D
investments is jointly increased by ? and ?, as suggested by the nominator ?2?
inside the square root (77), there is another positive e¤ect through the value of
delaying (assuming ? ? 0). This in essence reproduces the reasoning of Majd
and Pindyck (1987) why longer time to build makes delaying more attractive.
Thirdly, there is a negative e¤ect through the opportunity cost of delaying since
the expected return on the investments is higher when the competitor tends
to recapture the technological leadership with a longer lag. Finally, under the
downside protection there is another negative e¤ect through the opportunity
cost since the risk of observing an extreme shock value midstream, while still
undertaking R&D, increases with ?. Overall, we …nd that ?¤ is a monotonous
function of ?. This result is stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The optimal switching trigger increases monotonously in the
expected leapfrogging lag ?:
??¤
??
? 0?
for all ? ? ?min ?
Proof. De…ne
?1 = ?
??+ 1
??+ 2
¡ ??
and
?2 = (?¡ 1) (? ¡ ?)?
(? ¡ ?)?+ 2 ¡ (? ¡ 1)?
Then ?¤ = ?1?2?(?¡?) ?¢ and the problem is to show that
?1
?2? increases monoto-
nously in ?. By ordinary di¤erentiation,
?
??
?1
?2
? ? 0 , ¡??1
??
?
?1
+
??2
??
?
?2
? 1?
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Employing (78) yields
??1
??
?
?1
= ?
??
?? (?? + 1) +
?
??+2?
(??+ 1)?¡ (?? + 2)? = ?
¡ 1? 2?( 12 (??)2+?)?+2 (??+ 1) +
?
??+2?
(?? + 1)?¡ (??+ 2)?
= ?
2
( 12 (??)2+?)?+2
(??+ 1) ¡ ????+2
(?? + 2)? ¡ (??+ 1)? Q 0?
and
??2
??
?
?2
= ?
??
??(? ¡ ?)? + 2 ?¡?(?¡?)?+2(?¡ 1)
(? ¡ ?)?(?¡ 1) ¡ ((? ¡ ?)? + 2)(? ¡ 1)
= ?
¡ 2? ?( 12 (??)2+?)?+2 (? ¡ ?)?+ 2
?¡?
(?¡?)?+2 (?¡ 1)
(? ¡ ?)?(?¡ 1) ¡ ((? ¡ ?)? + 2)(? ¡ 1)
= 2
??
( 12 (??)2+?)?+2
¡ (?¡1)?
(?¡?)?+2
(? ¡ ?)?+ 2?¡?(? ¡ 1)
? 0?
Noting that ??
( 12 (??)2+?)?+2
? 0 in ??2(?)??
?
?2(?) and rearranging, we show that
¡
2
( 12 (??)2+?)?+2
(?? + 1) ¡ ????+2
(??+ 2)?? ¡ (??+ 1)
+ 2
?
(?¡?)?+2
?¡?
1¡?? +
2
?¡?
?¡1
1¡?| {z }
?¡ ??1(?)?? ??1(?)+
??2(?)
??
?
?2(?)
? 1?
Since ¡??1?? ??1 +
??2
??
?
?2 decreases monotonously in ? ? ?max for all parameter
con…gurations (proof omitted), it su¢ces that
¡
2
( 12 (??)2+?)?+2
(?? + 1) ¡ ????+2
(?? + 2)?? ¡ (??+ 1)
+ 2
?
(?¡?)?+2
?¡?
1¡??+
2
?¡?
?¡1
1¡?
! ? ? 1?
as ? ! 0. Since ? ! ¡1 and ?? ! ¡1 as ? ! 0, the limit is given by
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? = ¡ ??
(??+ 2)(?? + 1)
+
2
(? ¡ ?)?+ 2 ?
Obviously ? ? 1 for all ? ? 0, so we are done.
Proposition 4 establishes that the e¤ects on the expected R&D costs and on
the value of delaying dominate the two opportunity cost e¤ects with the implica-
tion that R&D investments become less attractive as the expected leapfrogging
lag gets larger. The relationship between ?¤ and ? is illustrated by Figure 6.
Table 3 goes on to compare ?¤ with the certainty trigger ?¤0 for di¤erent values
of ? when the other parameters are …xed at (?? ?? ?) = (0?2? 0?05? 0?03). We
notice that the percentage markup of ?¤0 over ?¤ goes down from around 29
percent to around 6?3 percent when ? goes up from 15 ? ?min = 14?46 to 100.
Consistently with Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996), this …nding gives evidence that
the optimal R&D rule is less sensitive to product market uncertainty (in the
mean preserving sense) when leapfrogging tends to be more lagged3 . The eco-
nomic intuition stems from the joint variance e¤ect of ? and ?. Namely, since
for large ? the return on the R&D investments is highly variable to begin with
(assuming ? ? 0), small increases in ? will not call for drastic revisions on the
optimal rule, in relative terms.
? ?¤ ?¤0
?¤0¡?¤
?¤
15 45?40 58?55 0?290
20 52?69 64?00 0?215
25 59?25 69?23 0?169
30 65?30 73?29 0?138
35 70?99 79?20 0?116
100 132?65 137?14 0?063
Table 3: e¤ect of lag on ?¤ and ?¤0
Competition intensity. The e¤ect of product market competition intensity, as
measured by the conjectural variations parameter ?, is captured by ¢ = ¢(?? ?)
where we recall that ? ? 1 is the cost down-scaling factor associated with inno-
vations. Since in the strong leapfrogging case 1 ? ?? · 1? the product market is
characterised by a persistent monopoly as in the Scumpeterian model of innova-
tion (endogenous growth), the Boone reallocation criterion is not operative and
?¤ is independent of ?. In the weak leapfrogging case 0 · ?? · 1 the criterion is
manifested by ?¢?? ? 0, so we have
??¤
??
? 0?
3Here ? ? ?0 = 0?152. The same sensitivity result holds true also for ? ? ?0.
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Figure 6: ?¤ and the expected leapfrogging lag
This …nding reproduces in a real options context what is in the modern inno-
vation literature known as the selection e¤ect of competition, originating with
Vickers (1995). The selection e¤ect in general terms pertains to industries where
multiple …rms coexist and are earning pro…ts: since intensifying competition in-
creases the incremental pro…ts earned by the technological leader relative to the
competitors (payo¤ from innovating), also the incentives for R&D get higher.
For further discussion, we refer to Aghion et al. (1997), Boone (1999), Aghion
et al. (2001) and Encaoua et al. (2004).
Since under pure Cournot competition
¢ =
1 ¡ ?
1 + ?
?
and under perfect competition
¢ = 2
1 ¡ ?
1 + ?
?
we have as a special case
?¤ =
?(?) ?+??+2? ¡ ?
(?(?) ¡ 1) ?¡??¡?+2? ¡ (? ¡ 1)
? ¡ ?
?
???
where ? 2
n
1+?
1¡? ?
1
2
1+?
1¡?
o
, respectively.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we analysed the optimal management of R&D investments in
a continuous time duopoly in which innovations yield competitive advantage
in the product market by enhancing the cost e¢ciency of production, there is
technological uncertainty through a Poisson innovation process, product market
uncertainty through a demand shock driven by a geometric Brownian motion,
and R&D cost uncertainty through a ‡ow cost driven by another geometric
Brownian motion. For ease of argumentation, the analysis was constructed in
a way that rules out genuine strategic interaction between the duopoly …rms.
Speci…cally, neck-and-neck competition in the product market and the escape
competition motive for R&D were ruled out by combining a leapfrogging dy-
namics with a one innovation limit on the technological gap. Furthermore, by
assuming both the R&D cost and the hazard rate of innovations are linear func-
tions of the R&D intensity, we took the real options perspective by stating that
the technological follower holds an in…nite sequence of options to switch between
an R&D mode and a suspension mode. Starting from the one dimensional case
where R&D cost uncertainty is excluded, we showed by standard methods of
stochastic control and dynamic programming that, in the absence of switching
costs (hysteresis), these options are associated with a unique switching trig-
ger that de…nes the optimal R&D rule for the technological follower under a
particular restriction of the parameter space.
The comparative statics of the switching trigger produced a number of im-
portant results. First and foremost, we established a U-shaped relationship
between the attractiveness of R&D investments and mean preserving increases
in product market uncertainty, by showing there exists a shock volatility thresh-
old at which the e¤ects on the value of delaying and on the opportunity cost
of delaying cancel each other out. Moreover, a quick comparison to the no-
uncertainty trigger revealed that the absence of product market uncertainty
always acts as a deterrent for R&D investments. By formal analogy, mean pre-
serving increases in R&D cost uncertainty were argued to have the same e¤ect
as those in product market uncertainty. Consequently, short run technologi-
cal progress in the duopoly is at its slowest in expected terms when there is
technological uncertainty only. The asymmetry of the shock distribution led us
to consider median preserving increases in product market uncertainty as well.
Interestingly, it turned out that the U-shape does not carry over: a median
preserving increase always renders R&D investments more attractive. The rea-
son, we argued, is that a median preserving increase entails an ampli…cation in
the opportunity cost of delaying such that the e¤ect on the value of delaying
is dominated also for higher volatility levels. The implications of technological
uncertainty were captured by inspecting the relationship between the switching
trigger and the expected leapfrogging lag (’time to build’). We showed that
a larger lag always renders R&D investments less attractive, arguing that the
e¤ects on the value of delaying and on the expected R&D costs are dominated
by the e¤ects on the opportunity cost of delaying and on the expected return
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on the investments. Finally, deriving from the Boone reallocation criterion, we
reproduced a central result of modern innovation literature, the selection e¤ect
of competition. That is, since the ‡ow pro…t spread between the technological
leader and the technological follower increases in the intensity of competition,
the converse holds true for the switching trigger.
Being highly simpli…ed to enable a closed form solution, the model can be
extended towards various directions. The …rst obvious extension would be to
relax the assumption that the …rms are identical in terms of R&D, by allowing
variation in the expected leapfrogging lag (e¢ciency of R&D) or/and in the
R&D costs. A second extension would be to allow neck-and-neck competition
and the escape competition motive by employing a step-by-step dynamics where
the technological gap can exceed one innovation. The ensuing strategic interac-
tion and increasing number of state value functions would presumably lead to
numerical analysis. A third extension would be to introduce hysteresis by as-
suming positive switching costs. A fourth extension would be to allow spillovers
and cumulative e¤ects from past R&D by use of a more elaborate innovation
process. Finally, in order to study the implications of uncertainty for long run
technological progress, the shock should be replaced with a process that has a
long run stationary distribution, such as a mean reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 3
In this appendix we show that ?¤ is a monotonously decreasing function of
median-preserving spreads in ?. Let ? denote the inverse of the LHS of (75):
? (?;?) = ¡((? + ?+ 2?)? ¡ 2(? + ?)) ?
2(?)
?2?(?) + ?
+
((? + ?+ 2?)?(?) ¡ 2(? + 2?)) ?
2
?2? + ?
+
(? + 2?)? ¡ (? + ?)?(?)
?
·
? ¡ ?+ 2?
? ¡ ? (? ¡ 1) ¡
? ¡ ?
? ¡ ? + 2?(?(?) ¡ 1)
¸
?
The problem then is to show that ? ? 0 inside the feasible parameter space W
de…ned in terms innovation hazard rate as ? · ?max, with ?max solving
?2(?max)
(? + 2?max) ¡ ??(?max)
? + ?max
? + 2?max
(? ¡ ?+ 2?max) · ?
2
? + ???
(? ¡ ?)? (79)
By ordinary di¤erentiation, ? satis…es
??
??
? 0?
and
??
??
? 0? (80)
Since also
??max
??
? 0?
it su¢ces to show that
? (?;?) ? 0?
for ? = ?max and ?max = ?max(?? ?; ?max). From (79), it can be shown that
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?max(?? ?; ?max) ? (1 + 2?)? =
µ
1 + 2
r
?
?
¶
?? (81)
We also recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that
? =
r
?
?
? (82)
and
?(?) = ¡
s
? + 2?
?
? (83)
for ? = ?max.
Evaluating ? for ? = ?max yields
? (?max;?) =
1
2?
[¡((? + ?+ 2?)? ¡ 2(? + ?))?(?) + ((? + ?+ 2?)?(?) ¡ 2(? + 2?))?] +
(? + 2?)? ¡ (? + ?)?(?)
?
·
? ¡ ? + ?
? ¡ ? (? ¡ 1) ¡
? ¡ ?
? ¡ ?+ 2?(?(?) ¡ 1)
¸
=
(? + 2?)? ¡ (? + ?)?(?)
?| {z }
?0
?(?max;?)?
where
?(?max;?) =
? ¡ ? + 2?
? ¡ ? (? ¡ 1) ¡
? ¡ ?
? ¡ ?+ 2?(?(?) ¡ 1) ¡
?
?
?
Since ???
?(?+2?)¡?(?)(?+?)
? ? 0, it is by (80) necessary that
??
?? ? 0. Making use
of this together with (81)-(83) yields for all ? ? ?max that
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?(?max;?) ? ?(?max;?max)
?
? + ? + 4?
q
?
?
? ¡ ? (
r
?
?
¡ 1) + ? ¡ ?
? + ?+ 4?
q
?
?
Ãs
?
?
+ 2 + 4
r
?
?
+ 1
!
¡
µ
1 + 2
r
?
?
¶
?
? + ? + 4?
q
?
?
? ¡ ? (
r
?
?
¡ 1) + ? ¡ ?
? + ?+ 4?
q
?
?
Ãs
?
?
+ 1 + 2
r
?
?
+ 1
!
| {z }
=
p ?
?+2
¡
µ
1 + 2
r
?
?
¶
= (? ¡ ?)
2 +
q
?
?
? + ? + 4?
q
?
?
¡
q
?
?
³
? + ?¡ 4?
q
?
?
´
+ 2?
? ¡ ?
= 2
?2
? ¡ ?
1 + ??
³
2
q
?
? ¡ 3
´
? + ?+ 4?
q
?
?
?
For all ?? ¸ 0 (particularly, for all ?? ¸ 1) the denominator
1 +
?
?
µ
2
r
?
?
¡ 3
¶
¸ 0?
Hence, ?(?max;?) ? 0 for all ? ? ?max. Since this implies that ? ? 0 inside
W , we are done.
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